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RELUCTANT
EUROCENTRISM
The Gulf War highlighted the ambivalent relationship of 
the Western Left to the Third World. Here, in a selection 
from his new English-language edition of essays, Hans 
Magnus Enzensberger casts doubt on the cult of
solidarity.
he intellectual world has its own dead' 
ly sins,, which are not to be found in the 
catechism. As if they didn't have their 
hands full with envy and gluttony, 
pride and fascination, the intellectuals are con­
stantly inventing (and trespassing against) new 
prohibitions. Venerable and familiar names, like 
those listed in the confessional—sloth, avarice, 
pride—are out of the question as sins for the 
intelligentsia; they lack the high-quality scien­
tific cachet, the watermark of abstraction.
Nor can the deviations of consciousness put in a claim for 
consecration by eternity. A wrathful god who would 
separate the white from the black sheep is not in sight, and 
the world spirit has fallen silent too. Rather, it's the 
watchdogs of whatever doctrine is dominant, if not indeed 
of fashion, who take care that the villain is exposed and the 
upright man is rewarded. So whoever sins intellectually, 
by no means risks eternal damnation. At worst he is reviled
for a while, pulled apart by critics or completely ignored. 
A few years or decades pass, a new register of sins is agreed 
upon, and the formerly depraved deviationist is 
rehabilitated. Anti-communism, for example, an aberra­
tion which was considered unforgivable among en­
lightened people for decades is today altogether socially 
acceptable again, indeed it is almost de rigeur.
It's quite a different matter, however, with the cardinal 
intellectual sin of the 70s, a mode of thought which bears 
the curious name Eurocentrism; its reprehensibility, I 
believe, remains unquestioned even today. The Europeans 
noticed quite early on that they are not alone in this world; 
and they turned this circumstance to their advantage quite 
early on. The history of our 'discoveries' consisted, as we 
know, of colonising the inhabitants of other continents, 
and that means conquering and robbing them.
Ethnology, a new science of humanity, owes its develop­
ment to this bloody process. Its Anglo-Saxon repre­
sentatives have introduced the am bitious name 
'anthropology' for their subject, a variation which, for lack
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of specialist knowledge, I would rather leave unexamined. 
After the seafarers and the soldiers, the adventurers and 
the missionaries, the planters and the engineers, the 
travelling scholars also fanned out in their turn, to discover 
what kind of peoples were to be converted and robbed, 
dvilised and exterminated, there in the remotest regions of 
the earth.
The more intelligent among the anthropologists soon 
noticed that their researches were leading them into an 
epistemological and moral labyrinth. Because it was 
precisely what interested them most, die otherness of what 
used to be called the primitive peoples, the savages, the 
barbarians, the coloured races, which remained inacces­
sible, and that not only because the latter received them 
with a mistrust that was all too justified.
But the real hindrance to research was the researcher him­
self, together with his discipline. It was this, like everything 
else that the ethnologist brought with him-his gaze, his 
standards, his prejud ices, his language-which placed itself 
between him and what he wanted to investigate, and so he 
ran the risk of bringing home only dead facts and living 
errors. His arrival alone was already a considerable in­
vasion of the societies he wanted to observe, an inter­
ference factor of incalculable magnitude.
It is not surprising therefore that the booty of anthropologi­
cal research consists largely of European fancies. It's our 
own reflection that perpetually appears on the projection 
screen of science; only we have no desire to recognise 
ourselves in it.
Ways of escaping ethnology's dilemma are few and risky. 
Of course, it is possible to postulate the equality of all 
human societies and to raise the demand that every com­
munity must be described and judged on the basis of its 
own conditions. But that is easier said than done. A consis­
tent relativism assumes an observer who would be in a 
position to leave his own cultural baggage at home. Such 
a scientist would not only ha ve to be a master of brainwash­
ing, he would also have to be capable of using it on himself. 
Only then would he, as an ethnologist, be completely free 
of his 'European' prejudices-but along with them of his 
science as well.
Another way of solving the dilemma-it could be called the 
existential one-is to gamble one's own identity. The re­
searcher becomes a kind of renegade. He joins his 
Melanesians, Nahuas, Malagasies in the bush. He goes 
native: that's what in their day the English colonial rulers 
called the irregular, unscientific form of such a change of 
identity. In anthropology, a mild version of this method is
ALR . M A V  f 991
30 FEATURES
described as 'participant observation'. The stranger adapts 
to the way of life he meets with, he tries to penetrate the 
mentality of the peoples with whom he is staying, by 
transforming himself into a Melanesian, Nahua, Malagasy.
It is evident that such experiments do not spirit away the 
original dilemma. They lead rather into an extensive maze 
of ambiguities. Because the researcher's transformation is 
an experiment with a time limit, an as-if, which once again 
divides him from his hosts. His ulterior motive remains 
intact. The anthropologist becomes an actor, a ventrilo­
quist or a spy.
These are roles which a respectable academic finds dif­
ficult. Anthropology as a swings-and-roundabout of cul­
ture and identity; not all researchers would be prepared to 
come to terms with such a definition. A minority sought 
and found a way out of the dilemma in the politicisation 
of their discipline They took the side of the oppressed and 
threatened peoples who were the object of their work. 
Some of these radical renegades saw the civilisation from 
which they came as the principal enemy of humanity. In 
accordance with the maxim 'the last shall be first', they 
believed in the future of the 'savages' and demonstrated 
their solidarity with them. And it was they who coined the 
term Eurocentrism and turned it polemically against their 
academic colleagues who preferred to remain what they 
were: professors in Uppsala and Gottingen, in Louvain, 
Cambridge and Paris.
All in all an esoteric business, one of those theoretical bones 
on which a small band of specialists gnaws in quiet and 
with some pleasure. So it might appear, and so indeed it 
was, until about 20 years ago. In the short period of time 
which has passed since then, the problem of Eurocentrism 
has irreversibly established itself in our consciousness— 
yes, one can say that in its most general and trivial form it 
has become a platitude.
The historical reasons are obvious. The collapse of 
European colonial rule in its traditional form, the liberation 
movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America and the 
political, economic and ideological consequences of this 
global process have fundamentally altered our picture of 
the world.
We have learned that we are in the minority, and that those 
others, the majority, are not hanging around somewhere 
on the periphery of the inhabited world as passive objects 
of our economic interests and our scientific curiosity. Such 
knowledge is not gained voluntarily; it only establishes 
itself when there is no other possibility.
Only 30 years ago Europeans and North Americans could 
still ignore the most enormous events without much effort; 
the Chinese Civil War, the colonial massacres in Indonesia 
and Madagascar were only hazily noticed. That only 
changed with the Algerian war, the Cuban revolution, the 
conflict in the Near East and the wars in Indochina. The 
brightly coloured scenes from the cigarette card album, the 
wax figures in the ethnological museum came to life, they 
turned up in person in the living room. The TV screen 
teemed with evidence. A problem that until then a couple
of anthropologists had discussed in their tent or in a semi­
nar, became the property of primary school teachers and 
leader writers, of sodal workers and parish priests.
Really understanding what was now on the agenda of 
history was another matter. That is obvious even from the 
attempts to give the state of affairs a name. The crudest 
terms were good enough to indicate the breach which had 
opened up before our eyes: over here the developed, over 
there the underdeveloped countries, over here the poor, 
over there the rich countries; and the confrontation be­
tween them was sometimes railed the international class 
struggle, and sometimes, in the euphemistic vocabulary of 
Social Democracy, the North-South conflict. In a futile 
effort to label an explosion, the majority of the others la 
Asia, Africa and Latin America were given the name 'the 
Third World'.
That this was not a concept, but a portmanteau, a semantic 
all-purpose term, became dear in the 70s at the latest, when 
the oil-produdng countries became the moguls of the 
world economy while in Africa and Indochina whole 
countries more or less starved.
Has there ever been a European who seriously believed 
that the yellow races were yellow? Did you really think 
that the Savages were savage, the Coloureds coloured, the 
Primitives primitive? Did you perhaps think that the ex­
plosion of the world could be numbered one, two and 
three? What can China and Niugini have in common, for 
example? If they have a common denominator at all, then 
it can only be defined negatively-and that is from our 
perspective: as lack. These people were missing some­
thing, whether it was history or development, a god ora 
state. And with that we have arrived at Eurocentrism 
again.
It's the commodities that tell the truth; the cassette re­
corders in the souks of Damascus, the Seiko watches in the 
shop windows of Peking, the jeans and the sunglasses, the 
whiskies, the perfumes and the cars. Above all, the care. 
No victorious liberation front, no starving tropical country, 
no pedagogic dicta torship, no matter how puritanical, gets 
by without them. Electrically controlled sliding windows, 
air conditioning, tinted and bullet-proof glass, stereo, auto­
matic locking devices—all inclusive.
This frenetic desire to imitate is a worldwide phenomenon 
whose implications no one has yet thought through to the 
end. Its effects are like those of a natural force, they are as 
irresistible and as little responsible to tire control of reason 
as an avalanche There has certainly been no shortage of 
attempts to analyse rationally the needs of poor and un­
derdeveloped countries. Again and again intermediate 
technologies were proposed in order to relate the struc­
tures of traditional societies to the demands of in­
dustrialisation.
After years of work, the engineers of a European car com­
pany developed a vehicle adapted to the conditionsof poor 
tropical countries. Built on a simple modular principle, it 
didn't need any rare, was economical, easy to repair and 
handle; it was also cheap, since all unnecessary accessories
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were missing. This car never went into production, since 
the countries concerned firmly refused to drive cheaper 
cars than the French or the Americans.
This confidence, or rather this lack of confidence, is not 
only to be observed in the drawing-board states of Central 
Africa; even great nations with a great past are not free 
from it In China a luxury limousine is still being manufac­
tured today which matches in every detail a Russian 
vehicle from the 50s which, in its turn, is copied from a 40s 
American Packard. This copy of a copy moreover bears the 
name *Red Flag'.
"Every chair; e ve ry  bottle of 
lem onade, is a  slavish 
imitation of a  foreign  
m o d e l "
On its sky-blue cover the Shanghai telephone directory 
shows happy people gazing at a sky which is pierced by 
television towers, rockets and satellites. The text is inter­
spersed with black and white adverts and coloured plates 
In which European-looking models display European 
women's fashions. The pieces of furniture are exact copies 
of those splay-legged side-tables, dressing tables and 
wardrobes which we remember from the Adenauer era. 
The whole book is a slim version of the Neckennann 
mail-order catalogue of 1957.
Now I haven't the least wish to poke fun at this evidence 
of Chinese modernisation policy. It's much too depressing 
for that. What makes one's heart sink is not the fact that the 
population of a poor country is insisting gendy but with 
elementary force on an improvement in its living stand­
ards, but the path of compulsive imitation that it adopts in 
doing so. It seems as if every mistake, every whim, every 
folly of the West has to be repeated, as if no deformation, 
no wrong turning can be left out.
Every chair, every bottle of lemonade, is a slavish imitation 
of a foreign model, as if it would be unthinkable to invent 
something of one's own, even if only a new reading-lamp 
or radio cabinet. It's inevitable that the copy is inferior to 
the original. It's not only the shortage of materials, and the 
industrial shortcomings that ensure that this is so; rather 
it's in the nature of the process itself, that the out of date, 
the stale and the shabby triumphs whenever a society puts 
up with living at second hand.
But, you will object, a society doesn't consist of com­
modities. Let the Chinese and the Peruvians, the Congolese 
and the Pakistanis make themselves comfortable however 
they like; the main thing is that they manage to get hold of 
the most essential things of all that a human being needs 
in order to live, a pair of shoes, a bowl of food, a doctor 
who can bind their wounds. No one can dispute that But 
the commodi ties propagate something beyond their imme­
diate consumption. At just that point at which each person
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has his shoes, his bowl, his surgeon-and this goal has been 
achieved in China-they prophesy the future victory of a 
single culture. But this culture is not Chinese.
Or do you think it doesn't make any difference whether 
someone carries out calculations with an abacus or with a 
computer? What happened to us at that moment when we 
sat down behind a steering wheel for the first time, alone, 
in our own car? Our tools, machines and products have 
altered us beyond recognition. Our idiotic archi tecture, our 
supermarkets, our three-room apartments, our cosmetics, 
our television programs which are spreading across the 
whole world are only individual elements of an evidently 
irresistible totality.
We've experienced more than one fiasco with 'the iron laws 
of history', but a person who watches television is very 
different from someone who listens to stories. A mandst 
thesis, which no one has yet refuted, says that the unfet­
tered productive forces of capitalist industry make short 
shrift of every recalcitrant legacy, every autonomous 
'superstructure'. They are the bulldozer of world history 
which clears away everything which blocks its way and 
levels every traditional culture.
And the commodities, appliances and machines are only 
the most visible part of what the 'developing countries' 
import. We supply them with weapons and toxins, techni­
ques of government and propaganda. Even the symbols of 
their sovereignty are slavish imitations of what they 
believe they have liberated themselves from through 
bloody struggles; the idea of the nation, the slogans of me 
revolution, the concept of the party, the emblems of 
statehood from national anthem to constitution, from flag 
to protocol. The idee fixe o f progress is increasingly being 
questioned by Europeans and North Americans; it 
dominates unchallenged only in the 'developing countries' 
of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The true Eurocentrics 
are the others.
It is probably fair to say that there is a lot of cant in Western 
anti-imperialist discourse. There is, by now, a long tradi-* 
tion of self-criticism in our part of the world, particularly 
on the Left Ever since the beginning of tire 20th century, it 
has been commonplace to complain about the decadence 
of Western civilisation, a thesis which has strong roots in 
conservative thought Marxist theory has emphasised the 
economic exploitation of colonial and ex-colonial societies 
which live by pilfering the Third World. *We are rich be­
cause they are poor'. Ln the course of time the myth of the 
Noble Savage has been resurrected in the shape of tiers- 
mondisme. The polemic against 'consumerism' has been a 
mainstay of the opposition ever since the 60s. Inevitably, 
idealist notions engender a rhetoric rich in banality and 
bad faith. An opposition based on them may be subjective­
ly well meant, but sooner or later it is bound to founder 
because there is no mediation between its 'convictions' and 
the social reality which it seeks to transform. The result is, 
even from a strictly moral point of view, painfully am­
biguous; the Left is just as Eurocentric as the rest of us. Its 
only d istinction is a bad conscience, reluctant 
Eurocentrism.
32 FEATURES
Others, however, and perhaps they are the best among us, 
take a different decision. I'm not thinking about the drilling 
engineers in their air-conditioned ghettos, or the 
businessmen in their private jets, or the mercenaries, 
policemen and marines, but about the doctors on the Cam­
bodian border and the agronomists in the Sahel; about 
people who have given up their three-room apartments in 
Wuppertal or St Louis in order to train mechanics some­
where in the bush or sink wells in the desert.
The readiness to render spontaneous, altruistic aid appears 
so strange under prevailing conditions that one responds 
with perplexity to such non-conformists. Some admire 
them, others call them, with a certain dubious respect, 
idealists. Yet others shake their heads or even believe mem 
to be unsuspecting tools of some imperialist plot.
That is always unjust and usually wrong. Nevertheless, it 
is still necessary to enquire about the inner motives and the 
meaning of that solidarity with the Third World' that stirs 
here and there in the industrial countries of the West. 
Official development aid doesn't need to concern us any 
further; its political and economic goals are not secret after 
all. It is a matter of spheres of influence, raw materials, 
export interests. The development policies of every in­
dustrial power East or West are the continuation of colonial 
policies by other means.
Anyone, on the other hand, who risks his life as a doctor 
in order to dress the wounds of rebels or refugees in some 
African civil war has something else in mind; and some­
thing of this larger interest is also to be found among those 
who have stayed at home, working on obscure committees 
to raise money for imprisoned trade unionists in Bolivia. 
The self-deceptions to which such a commitment can lead 
are well known, and it's also no secret that the ritual 
playing of Chilean protest songs in Berlin bars had no 
noticeable influence on the bloody course of events in that 
country.
But independently of that, of how seriously or half-hear­
tedly, of how effectively or how ineffectively the helpers of 
the Third World' may go to work, they are agreed on one 
point, and this point is the decisive one: they all identify 
themselves with a cause which is not their own. In this 
respect, they are the successors of those ethnologists who 
understood themselves as cultural renegades. The Dane 
who makes the problems of the Eskimos his own, the 
student from Massachusetts who organises a lobby for the 
defence of the Brazilian Indians: all these people want to 
help not only others but themselves too, and this is com­
pletely legitimate.
One could perhaps call what they are looking for among 
those distant peoples the utopian minimum. The stubborn 
hope which they place in the future of the Third World' 
corresponds to their scathing critique of the society which 
produced them and which has consumed any utopian 
surplus. The ideological shreds of marxism or religion in 
which some of them clothe their search cannot conceal the 
fact that the goal of this search is to find the 'completely 
other'.
But what if this 'completely other' doesn't exist? These 
peoples, proud of their own traditions, unhampered by 
'consumerism', less decadent and ruined, but older, purer, 
less corruptible than we are, pursuing their own project 
despite sacrifices and haidships-perhaps they exist only 
in the imagination of those who are looking for them?
And does this search not also have a disagreeable side? 
Does it not reproduce the old dilemma of the 
anthropologist, forever confronted by his own ghosts in the 
stranger's minor. Is the Third World' in the end nothing 
more than a projection?
At any rate, there's something odd about the enthusiasm 
with which many visitors from the industrialised world 
regard the spartan features of some 'liberation 
movements'. Someone who, having flown 4000 miles, en­
thuses about the unique dignity of the rice fanners cultivat­
ing their fields with their Bare hands standing knee deep 
in the mud, deserves to have his behaviour railed moral 
cretinism rather than solidarity. And what about the iron 
social oontrol, the sexual repression, the dull-witted for­
malism, the bureaucratic despotism which weighs upon 
large parts of the underdeveloped world? We can't judge 
that from our position, these are transitional phenomena, 
the people there have different needs...Admittedly that 
wouldn t be right for us, but in their circumstance s...And 
soon.
Is that not the most naked racism masked as sympathy? Is 
it asking too much for an American in Angola, a Swede in 
China, a German in Cuba, to say to himself, at least once a 
day, as an experiment: These people are just like us? And 
that means that they do not only want schools and hospi­
tals, canteens and barracks. They want to choose their 
profession just like us. They want to love one another. They 
want to have the choice. They want to have freedom of 
movement They want to think for themselves and make 
decisions for themselves. And apart from that they want 
machines instead of flails, cars instead of hand-carts, 
refrigerators, holiday trips, telephones, three-room apart­
ments. Just like us.
Since the abandonment of the last alternative project of 
history, that of Mao Zedong, only one future seems still to 
be left. The peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America have 
fallen under the spell of a universal cargo cult: everything 
new, whether for good or ill, comes from the industrial 
countries, and everything old must be sacrifi ced to the new.
But the massive approval which our civilisation receives 
does not fill us with triumph. On the contrary, it disap­
points us, irritates us, makes us uneasy. We have no desire 
to be number one. We long ago got out of the habit of 
regarding Europe as die navel of die world, and we find 
the idea that the future of the human race could resemble 
a migration of lemmings led by us altogether depressing.
There are several reasons, subjective and objective, good 
and bad, why we don't like to be confronted by the 
Eurocentrism of the underdeveloped. It is not an uplifting 
thought to be flag-bearers of a civilisation whose 
catastrophic potential becomes more obvious year by year.
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It has never been the case before in history that humanity 
has staked everything on a single card. To a certain extent 
it lived scattered in a great number of autonomous cul­
tures, each one pursuing its own project. Looked at in that 
way, the Tower of Babel had its positive side: far from 
coming to terms with one another, a multiplicity of 
(odeties evolved, inventing specific solutions for their 
own survival. With the industrial revolution this diversity 
began to disappear. Its last remnants are being liquidated 
before our eyes. That's not only sad, it's very dangerous; 
because the more homogeneous a population is, the more 
tusceptible it is to catastrophes and the gloomier are its 
prospects for the future.
Besides, it's as good as certain that our able successors in 
the poorer countries are backing the wrong horse. A simple 
computer projection of their needs and of the resources 
which would be required to generalise the material stand­
ards of the Western industrial countries demonstrates the 
hopelessness of such an undertaking. Three billion cars, 
400 million tons of meat, 40 million gigawatt hours of 
electricity, 12 billion tons of oil per annum. The planet 
which is our home can't provide all that. The consequences 
of unchanged targets are wars of distribution, extortion, 
vast conflicts. The Third World's' enthusiastic willingness 
to learn does not only worry us for noble reasons. The 
doser industrial progress gets to the ecological limits of 
capacity, the more our civilisation resembles a zero-sum 
game: one player's gain is another's loss.
But the existence of the others with projects that weren't 
ours, the existence of fundamentally different cultures 
somehwere out there in the jungle, in the taiga, in the 
desert, was also a psychological comfort to the 'civilised' 
of the earth. These distant neighbours meant a relief from 
the strain. They allowed us to dream of another, lost life. 
Whenever the price we had to pay for progress washurting 
us, we thought of the others, savages, blacks, bedouins, 
orientals, nomads, Eskimos, hunters, Malays, inhabitants 
of mythical islands; the naive patchwork of a colourful 
humanity, that was different from us, and with whom our 
disappointed hopes found an ambiguous refuge. We im­
posed upon the others what our own industrialised exist­
ence denied us, desires, promised lands, utopias. This 
method of projection is deeply rooted in the European 
tradition. I even believe that the internationalism of the 
Left in Europe and North America derives for the greatest
Ert from such sources. So the revolutionary hope which scome to nothing is transferred further and further into 
the distance, first to Russia and Central Asia, then to China 
and to the so-called Third World.
it is time to take leave of such dreams. It was always an 
illusion that liberation could be delegated to the faraway 
others; today this self-deception has become a threadbare 
evasion. An exotic alternative to industrial civilisation no 
longer exists. We are encircled and besieged by our own 
limitations.
be increased? How can agriculture be mechanised? These 
are questions which were on the agenda in Europe and 
N ora America a hundred years ago. It is part of the fateful 
inheritance of the underdeveloped countries that they are 
unable to set themselves any historically new problems. 
That is a consequence of their situation and not, as the 
incorrigible racists among us imagine, of some kind of 
original inferiority.
It is the West that remains, spreading out in every direction. 
The new problems are being posed here, and here alone, 
and here alone are to be found, sparingly enough, the new 
solutions. Not too much has occurred to us in recent 
decades: apart from birth control, ecology, feminism, they 
have been, above all, technological tricks—microcom­
puters, means of communication, and decisive steps in 
basic research, principally in molecular biology.
But perhaps, behind our backs as it were, something else 
has happened that would be much more momentous. 
Perhaps that savage, distant, brightly coloured diversity 
which was external to our civilisation has immigrated into 
its centres. The increasing dangerousness of everyday life 
in the great cities of the West would be one indication of 
that. The more the exotic is eliminated worldwide and the 
more traditional diversity is made to conform, the more 
the industrial societies become a patchwork internally. Not 
only the United States, but also France, Sweden, West 
Germany are melting pots today, multi-racial states. Ethnic 
minorities, subcultures, political and religious sects estab­
lish themselves in the metropoles. This unpredictable con­
fusion is not only a result of immigration from outside, its 
roots lie in the same historic continent that gave birth to 
industrial growth.
The vitality of the West derives, in the end, from the 
negativity of European thinking, its eternal dissatisfaction, 
its voracious unrest, its lack. Doubt, self-criticism, self- 
hate, even, are its most important productive forces. It's 
our strength that we can't accept ourselves and what we 
have produced. That's why we regard Eurocentrism as a 
sin of consciousness. Western civilisation lives from 
whatever calls it into question, whether it's barbarians or 
anarchists. Red Indians or Bolsheviks. And if a cultural 
other is no longer available, then we just produce our own 
savages; technological freaks, political freaks, psychic 
freaks, cultural freaks, moral freaks, religious freaks. Con­
fusion, unrest, ungovernability are our only chance. Dis­
unity makes us strong.
From now on we have to rely on our own resources. No 
Tahiti is in sight, no Sierra Maestre, no Sioux and no Long 
March. Should there be such a thing as a saving idea, then 
we'll have to discover it for ourselves.
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